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THE HUMAN RIGHT OF FREEDOM OF RELIGION 
AND SOVIET LAW 
Otto Luchterhandt 
I. The Presuppositions of Intemational Law and Their Consequences for a 
Fundamental Assessment of the Human-Rights Problematic in the U.S.S.R. 
The freedom of religion has both an individual and a collective or institu­
tional legal character. It is a comprehensive human right, which takes shape in 
many particular rights. These rights represent in part the concretizing of other 
human rights within a religious framework. These rights today are guaranteed­
to a more or less broad extent-by those states which are bound to the European­
North American constitutional tradition and which have made human rights and 
freedom the basis of their political systems. Therefore, the laws of individual 
freedom of religion show far-reaching similarities, while the differences with 
respect to the legal status of churches and religious communities could be con­
siderable. Here, historical traditions, confessional peculiarities, and cultural idio­
syncracies of the countries of course play a great role. 
It would be a grave methodological error-unfortunately, very frequently 
committed in the literature-to pick out an ideal Western nation with the great­
est measure of individual and collective freedom of religion and to criticize the 
lt;gal and social situation of religious persons and communities in the socialist, 
ideological states against this standard. It is apparent that sµch a procedure is 
arbitrary and incorrect. The question of the standard is a difficult one. Happily, 
the difficulties are essentially eliminated for us by fundamental, international 
human-rights agreements which the Soviet Union has not only signed but has 
also ratified and which, moreover, today enjoy a far-reaching recognition in the 
international legal community. These are of significance: 
1. the International Covenant of December 16, 1966, concerning civil and 
political rights; 
2. the International Covenent of December 16, 1966, concerning economic, 
social, and cultural rights; 
3. the UNESCO Convention against discrimination in education of Decem­
ber 15, 1960; 
4.- the I.LO. Convention against discrimination in employment and profes­
sion of June 4, 1958; and 
5. the Declaration of November 25, 1981, on religious intolerance and dis­
crimination which, unfortunately, is not a legally binding international 
norm. 
These international conventions guarantee the following special rights, which 
-taken together-constitute the human right of freedom of religion as it is legally 
binding, by international covenant, on the Soviet Union. From the critical per-
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spective .of a liberal, democratic, constitutional state, it is barely more than a 
minimum standard: 
1. The freedom for each person-adult or child-to choose for her or him­
self a religion or worldview, to hold it, and to change it (Art. 18, para. 1, Civil 
Rights Covenant). 
2. The right to be permitted to make use of these rights without external 
coercion (Art. 18, para. 2, Civil Rights Covenant). 
3. The freedom to confess one's religion or worldview alone or in commu­
nity with others privately through worship, in the form of religious customs, or 
through education or other practices (Art. 18, para. 1, Civil Rights Covenant). 
4. The freedom to confess one's religion or worldview publicly, whether 
alone or in community with others (Art. 18, para. 1, Civil Rights Covenant). 
5. The freedom for parents or other authorized teachers to educate children 
in accord with their religious convictions (Art. 18, para. 4, Civil Rights Covenant; 
Art. 5, UNESCO Convention). 
6. The freedom for parents to delegate the religious and moral education of 
their children to a third person (for example, clergy) (Art. 18, para. 4, Civil 
Rights Covenant; Art. 13, para. 3, Social Rights Covenant; Art. 5, UNESCO 
Convention). 
7. The right of parents to choose educational institutions independent of 
the state so as to secure the religious and moral education of their children or, 
if such institutions do not yet exist, to found them (Art. 13, para. 3, Social 
Rights Covenant). 
8. The fundamental rights of equality for all religious persons, that is, the 
right to practice all the human rights guaranteed in the international conventions 
without discrimination on account of religious affiliation. 
This means especially: 
9:-·The fight not to be discriminated against because of religious views when 
practicing freedom of opinion, freedom to spread opinions, and freedom of in­
formation (Art. 2, para. 1, and Art. 19, Civil Rights Covenant); in other words, 
religious freedom of opinion, propaganda, and information. 
10. Correspondingly, the right to meet for religious purposes results from 
supra (Art. 2, para. 1, and Art. 21, Civil Rights Covenant). 
11. In the same way, the right to found and join religious societies is derived 
(Art. 2, para. 1, and Art. 22, Civil Rights Covenant). 
12. The right not to be hindered from the practice of general freedom of 
movement in one's homeland on account of religious affiliation (Art. 2, para. 1, 
and Art. 12, para. 1, Civil Rights Covenant). 
13. The right not to be hindered from leaving (Art. 2, para. 1, and Art. 12, 
para. 2, Civil Rights Covenant) or entering the country on account of religion 
(Art. 2, para. 1, and Art. 12, para. 4, Civil Rights Covenant). 
14. Equal access of religious citizens to all public educational institutions, 
both general and professional (Art. 2, para. 2, and Art. 13, para. 1, Social Rights 
Covenant; Art. 1, UNESCO Convention). 
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15. Equal access of religious citizens to professional and work places, includ­
ing those of "public service" (Art. 2, pars. 2, and Art. 6. or Art. 7, Social Rights 
Covenant; Art. 25, Civil Rights Covenant). 
16. Equal participation of religious citizens in the political affairs of the 
country and equal access to the positions of political leaders.hip (Art. 2, para. 2, 
and Art. 25, Civil Rights Covenant). 
17. The right of religious minorities "together with other members of their 
group to attend to their own cultural life, to confess and practice their own reli­
gion or to make use of their own language" (Art. 27, Civil Rights Covenant). 
While the prohibitions against discrimination are valid without reservation, 
the freedom rights stand under the well-known condition of "public order"; that 
is, according to Art. 18, para. 3 of the Civil Rights Covenant, "The freedom to 
manifest one's religion or worldview is to be subjected to only those legal limita­
tions which are necessary for the protection of public security, order, health, 
morals or the basic rights and freedom of others." This reservation means, doubt­
less, a strong relativization of the guarantee of freedom. It does not represent an 
"escape clause," however, which is open to just any interpretation. The authori­
zation conceded to a state to limit freedom of religion as well as political free­
dom and freedom of movement through this provision is itself subject to specific 
limitations, namely: 
1. The limitations must be made normative in a formal way through a 
"law"; a legislative act of a lesser rank or an administrative measure does not 
suffice. 
2. The law is permitted to provide only for "limitations" (cf. Art. 18, para. 
3). Explicitly forbidden is not only the formal but also the actual abrogation of 
rights through their legal undermining (Art. 5, para. 1, Civil Rights Covenant; 
also Social Rights Covenant). 
· -- 3. Freedom of religion-may not be set aside through emergency measures; it 
is not to be jeopardized by crises (Art. 4, Civil Rights Covenant). 
4. The legal limitations may not affect the prohibition against religious dis­
crimination. 
5. Freedom of religion may be limited only for the protection of enumer· 
ated, general, elementary legal norms of the society as well as for the protection 
of fellow citizens' human rights. The restrictive character of this delimitation is 
such that, in contradistinction to specifically political human rights such as free­
dom of opinion, of the press, of assembly, and of association {cf. Art. 19, 21, 
22, Civil Rights Covenant), the criterion of "national security" is inapplicable 
(cf. Art. 18, para. 3, Civil Rights Covenant). 
Notwithstanding these distinctions, moreover, all the measures a state might 
enact for the limiting of human rights stand under the prohibition against abro­
gating them de facto or, indeed, de jure. Herein lies a grave problem by which 
the characteristic situation of the human right of freedom of religion in ideologi­
cally closed Communist states moves into sharp focus. The Soviet Constitution 
of October 7, 1977, linked the practice of personal religious and political free-
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dom and of other democratic rights ta the reservation that they be iii positive 
"agreement with the goals of the building of Communism" (cf. Art. 47 and 51, 
Soviet Cor:stitution), or likewise "in accordance with the interests of the people 
and in order to strengthen and to develop the socialist system" (cf. Art. 50, 
Soviet Constitution). 
Moreover, each and every basic right of the Soviet citizen stands under the 
following duties, which are to be interpreted in accordance with the official 
Soviet ideology, to wit: "to respect the rules of socialist community life," "to 
prove oneself worthy of the high calling of a citizen of the U.S.S.R." (Art. 59, 
para. 2, Soviet Constitution) and, furthermore, "to protect the interests of the 
Soviet state and to contribute to the strengthening of its power and authority" 
(Art. 62, para. 1, Soviet Constitution). 
The full juridical meaning of this attendant, obligatory qualification of 
Soviet basic rights first reveals itself when one looks at Art. 6 of the Soviet 
Constitution. There it is determined that the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union alone possesses the exclusive power to determine authoritatively the inter­
ests of the people, the political goals of the Soviet state, and the measures for 
their realization. That means nothing other than that the practice of the funda­
mental rights of the Soviet citizen stands under the sovereign reser\rations of the 
party and state leadership or, to put it another way, that under Soviet constitu­
tional law-I emphasize: law-the practice of fundamental rights consists essen­
tially in the fulfillment of party directives. This is precisely, however, no longer 
a "limitation" in the sense of the human-rights conventions but rather the aboli­
tion or abrogation of human rights per se. 
The meaning of human rights does not consist in the dutiful furtherance of 
the common good according to the directives of the party-state, but rather in the 
free development of individuals in moral self-responsibility with respect for the 
·equal rights of their fellow human beings and for the elementary conditions of 
a peaceful common life in community in the free participation in the shaping of 
the political order by having at their disposal an indeterminate number of spiri­
tual and political behavior alternatives among which they can freely choose. 
Jndeed, the individual also possesses duties with regard to the state-thus, 
Art. 29 of the General Declaration of Human Rights of December 10, 1948-but 
they represent something other than rights. Unfortunately, one must point out 
this self-evident fact with respect to the Communist states. Art. 19, para. 3 of 
the Civil Rights Covenant, which .speaks of the "special duties and a special obli­
gation" with regard to the practice of freedom of opinion, would be meaningless 
if the basic rigl1t of expression of opinion had already been conceived-as it un­
fortunately'is in the Soviet Constitution-as a duty. 
With this abrogation of human rights and freedom placed in the very struc­
ture of the Soviet Constitution, there arises a profound problem for freedom of 
religion. Religion does not have, so to speak, a sharply defined, clearly demar­
cated area as its object; rather, it flows out of the entire spiritual and practical 
life of human beings and thus stands in an indissoluble, mutual relationship with 
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all intellectual and, of course, political activities of human beings. Because the 
freedom of the spirit is indivisible, the (partial) muzzling of the spirit by the 
dominant, institutional, secular ideology, with its .claim to absoluteness-which, 
in principle, is not different from the state religion of a confessionally exclusive 
state of the seventeenth or eighteenth centuries-necessarily endangers freedom 
of religion. This remains true even when religion is broadly tolerated and effec­
tive, as it is today in Poland and the German Democratic Republic. These two 
examples from the Communist-ruled world show that a limited coexistence and 
a relatively far.-reaching tolerance of religious citiz�ns-given the circumstances­
are possible even in an ideologically Communist state with its attendant human­
rights nihilism, given a pragmatic attitude on the part of the party and state lead­
ership. 
The Soviet Union is also capable of making such accommodations, as was 
initially demonstrated by the relatively liberal modus vivendi which existed 
between the Soviet state and the religious communities, namely, the Russian 
Orthodox Church, between 1943 and 1958. It is therefore in no way prima 
fade senseless to direct corresponding human-rights demands to the address of 
the U. S. S. R., even apart from the fact that the observance of human rights in 
principle must be insisted upon for all states, especially for those-such as the 
U. S. S. R.-which have admitted, for whatever motives, the int�mational, bind­
ing, legal nature of such rights. 
II The Typical Violations, Restrictions, and Discriminations concerning 
Religious Freedom and Religious Citizens in the Soviet State 
In the following expositions, aspects of individual rights as guaranteed by 
international law will be dealt with systematically from the perspective of the 
restrictions and discriminations hostile to human rights to which they are sub­
ject. 
A. Freedom of Religious Profession-Freedom of Religious Opinion 
Insofar as freedom of religious profession is a part of the freedom of reli­
gious opinion, it shares the chief problematic of this human right in the Soviet 
state, namely, its strangulation by the application of certain penalties: 1 
1. Art. 190, para. 1 of the Russian Federation (R.S. F. S.R.) Penal Code 
(hereafter abbreviated R. F. P. C.) considers as punishable "the spread of con­
sciously false fabrications that defame the system of the Soviet state and society." 
The infamous Art. 70 of the R. F. P. C. ("anti- Soviet agitation and propaganda") 
formally elevates this action to a crime, if the pers6n expressing the opinion 
1A broad discussion of freedom of speech is found in Otto Luchterhandt, UN-Mensch­
e11rechtskonventionen-Sowjetrecl1t-Sowjetwirklichkeit: Ein kritischer Vergleich (Baden­
Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1980), p. 107. 
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simultaneously intended with his or her "falsifications" the "subversion or weak-
. ening of Soviet power." With the assistance of these totally capriciously inter­
preted definitions, Soviet criminal prosecution authorities and courts have long 
suppressed critical remarks about the actual and legal situation of religious com­
munities in the Soviet state as well as about the religious politics of the party 
and state l�adership-whereby it was completely irrelevant to them if the criti­
cism dealt with provable or proved facts. This means that critical examination of 
their own status in the Soviet state is forbidden to religious Soviet citizens. In 
this regard they must comply with the official regulating of speech, which-as 
the foreign propaganda of the Moscow Patriarchate sufficiently proves-describes 
religious affair$in the U.S.S.R. in the most favorable light. 
2. In practice, the direction of Art. 14 2 of the R. F. P. C. (March 16, 1966, 
version) operates with further limitations. It considers punishable the production 
of any kind of documents-including "letiers"-which call for the nonfulftllment 
of religious legislation, in order to circulate them on a wide scale. This regulation 
is directed particularly against the exercise of the right of petition by religious 
citizens, because the mere production of a petition demanding the change or lift­
ing of anti-religious regulations is enough for the courts to determine the culpa­
bility (this is interpreted as a call for disobedience). The subjective intention of 
mass circulation is indisputably concluded from the objective suitability of the 
documents for circulation. 
3. Also threatened by these realities of political criminal law are religious 
citizens who through the confession of their faith separate themselves critically 
from atheism and thereby particularly from the atheistic premises of Communist 
ideology. An energetic apologetics, one not restricted to nebulous formulations, 
oversteps the limits of tolerance of religious freedom in the Soviet Union Qudg­
ing from how the authorities act). This is also totally consistent, since, in a Com­
munist worldview which takes itself seriously, criticism of atheistic materialism 
. mt1�t_.Q_(l considered a direct attack on the bases of the Constitution. From this 
there result direct and serious consequences for the content of sermons. Through 
the special (investigatory) censorship of sermons by the authorities the meaning­
ful addressing of listeners in everyday Soviet life is for the most part prevented. 
4. Art. 227 of the R. F. P. C. standardizes a further express restriction of 
religious freedom which is directed against certain sects. According to the article, 
one becomes liable to punishment if one occasions "the renunciation of societal 
activity." That "participation in public life" is a criminally protected section of 
the law may appear odd to a citizen of a liberal, democratic, constitutional state, 
to whom retreat into private life is for the most part open. As noted, active 
support of the state is a constitutional obligation in the Soviet system. Renuncia­
tion of community life arouses mistrust and, if practiced for any length of time, 
leads to personal difficulties. For the rest, the evidence of criminality rests on 
the solid tenet of anti-religious education that the best "cure" for religion is 
participation in public affairs, the incorporation of religiously "infected" people 
into the "collective." 
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B. The Freedom to Spread Religious Opinions 
The religious freedom to spread opinions is a further aspect of the freedom 
of confession. It concerns the prQcess of confession, which can happen privately 
or publicly. orally or in writing. The freedom of religious propagation was 
expressly guaranteed in the Constitution until 1929.2 It then disappeared from 
the Constitution; since then, only the right "to confess a desired religion and to 
practice religious rites" stands over against the freedom of atheistic propagation 
that is guaranteed in Art. 52 of the Soviet Constitution. Soviet authorities derive 
from it to this day a general prohibition of religious propagation.3 One must 
conclude from practice that they tolerate the oral spreading of religious views 
through private conversations and intervene administratively only when they 
assume the character of a systematic canvassing. Profession in private correspon­
dence is exempt from punishment. 
The public spreading of religious views is forbidden, however. Insofar as it 
occurs orally, it is treated as an infringement of the community order; when 
it occurs in written form, the authorities consider it an evasion of the compre­
hensive censorship provisions whose formil observation is protected by the regu­
lations of the political criminal law. Religious propagation not authorized by 
the state is considered per se a "defamation of Soviet reality" or "anti-Soviet 
propaganda." As it deals here with such materials as samzidat, one refers most­
ly to other crimes, especially to "involvement in forbidden business" (Art. 162, 
R. F. P. C ) . What is meant here is, for example, the business of a religious printer, 
as in the case of the underground publisher "Christianin," through which the 
Reformed Baptists formerly published religious writings in large numbers, but 
whose collaborators without exception have been sentenced to a more or less 
severe punishment. 
The forbidding of public religious propagation, however, is not without 
exception. Strictly speaking, one could include sermons here. However, they are 
of course an integral component of the worship service and therefore belong to 
the freedom of worship. It is different with religious literature, especially with 
magazines, which the spiritual leadership of the licensed religious communities 
of the Soviet state are permitted to publish, above all the journal from the Mos­
cow Patriarchate, which even has its own publishing department at its disposal. 
It is juridically decisive that these exceptions to the prohibition of religious 
propagation are completely at the political discretion of the state authorities. 
Consequently, religious citizens have no legal claim for the editing of religious 
literature, because that permission is granted them upon the fulfillment of cer-
2See Otto Luchterhandt, Der Sowjetstaat und die Russfsch-Orthodoxe Kirche (Cologne: 
Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1976), p. 89. 
3Elaborated in Otto Luchterhandt, Die relfgf6se Gewfssensfrelheit im Sow/etstaat. Tell 
II: Die Rechtstellung der Gliiubigen nach dem Grundrecht der Gewissensfreihrit. Berichte 
des Bundesinstituts fiir ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien 40 (Cologne, 197 6), 
pp. 20-24. 
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tain- legally detennined and realizable prescriptions. The prohibition in principle 
of religious propagation cannot be justified by the criteria of internationally 
recognized law, the "ordre public," the public order and safety, the health and 
rights of fellow citizens. Its sole aim lies in the attempt to restrict artificially the 
developmental possibilities of religious citizens. 
Apart from ¢.at, the juridical prohibition of religious propagation in the 
U.S.S.R. violates international law's prohibition of discrimination, for, in con· 
trast to the religious Soviet citizen, the atheist citizen is expressly empowered, as 
noted, to practice "propagation" corresponding to his or her convictions. Art. 2, 
para. I, and Art. 19, para. I of the Civil Rights Covenant are thereby violated. 
C. Negative Freedom of Conscience4 
The stipulation of Art. 18, para. 2 of the Civil Rights Covenant, that no 
one may be subject to "pressure" which encroaches on one's freedom to have or 
accept a religion or conviction of one's choice, encounters absolutely insolvable 
problems in an ideological state, and this is especially the case with the U.S.S.R. 
For, contrary to the liberal, anti-clerical phrase that was taken over by the Bol­
sheviks, "Religion is a private matter," and contrary to Lenin's express injunc­
tion against the statistical determination of religious membership, Soviet authori· 
ties have long striven to record religious citizens by name. This was done espe­
cially through observation of local congregations, through the obligatory state­
controlled registration of all religious functions, and through methods of empiri­
cal social research. The determination of religious membership and the social 
composition of the congregations fonn the decisive condition for th� so-called 
"individual work with believers." This is the technical Soviet tenn for the syste­
matic ideological indoctrination of the religious citizen at the workplace, at 
school, and at home through primary and secondary agitators. From an organiza­
tional viewpoint, this is a system of psychically enforced atheisization in which 
authorities, services, educational institutions, unions, the Komsorriol, and the 
Pioneer organizations-as well as further special organizations-work together as 
one, and according to plan, under the direction of the local party committees. 
The work of this machine constitutes a flagrant infringement, even a mocking, of 
the negative freedom of conscience of the religious Soviet ciJizen. It clearly runs 
counter to Art. 18, para. 2 of the Civil Rights Covenant.· 
D. The Freedom of Religious Association 
Because the practice of religion regularly takes place within the community, 
and usually occurs within the context of organized religion, the freedom of reli­
gious association occupies. a central significance. This is especially true for the 
Soviet Union because religious practice there is restricted to the legal religious 
communities, outside of a private area that is hardly worth mentioning (more 
40n-thls, see ibfd., pp. SS-68. 
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about this later). The freedom of religious association consists of the right to 
start a religious community, or a part of one, as well as the right to join an exist-
ing religious community. 
· 
Religious associations in- the U.S.S.R. are either local "societies," that is, 
groups of at least twenty adult founders, or "groups of believers," which must 
consist of at least three founders with the same worship views. 5 The associations 
may assume their activity when they have been accepted by the state. This 
occurs through the act of registration, for the granting of which the Council 
for Religious Affairs of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. in Moscow is, 
responsible. The Council decides on the application according to its political 
judgment. Thus, citizens have no legal right with regard to permission. There is 
also a reljgfous association prohibition, from which exception can be made in 
unusual cases, but in reality this does not happen very often, for the Soviet state 
is not interested in the blossoming of religious associations but, in accordance 
with its own ideological declaration, in their "dying out." 
There is an absolute prohibition of association for a list of "sects'; whose 
doctrinal teachings and activities have an "anti-state or gruesome and fanatical 
character," a very indistinct description that is direeted first and foremost against 
all religious associations that are not prepared to accept the repressive conditions 
of religious practice in the Soviet state. 6 Affected by name are the Jehovah's .: 
Witnesses, the Reformed Baptists, and other splinter groups from officially per­
mitted religious communities or denominations. The members of those religious 
communities which are committed to resistance are persecuted in accordance 
with Art. 227 of the R. F. P. C. On the basis of these prohibitions, there is in the 
U.S.S. R. today practically a numents clausus of religious societies. 
Should- the application for permission be allowed for a religious association, 
the founders receive at the same time consent to use a space for worship, be it 
in a church or other building. A special-use contract is concluded with the local 
state administration. 
As far as the right to join is concerned, all members of a particular religious 
community have the right to become formal members of the local association in 
question. Nevertheless, in actuality the authorities have long demurred to admit 
more than twenty to thirty persons (so-<;alled dvadcatki, or "Commuruties of 
Twenty"). 
E. The Extent of the Right of Organized Worship 
The sanctioned religious communities in essence are restricted to the wor· 
ship service itself as well as the remaining activities which are absolutely neces­
sary for the preservation of the cult (such as the preparation of future members) .. 
5Ibid., pp. 25-30. 
6Art. 23, instruction on the application of the legislation on worship of March 16, 1961; 
German translation is in Otto Luchterhandt, Die Religfonsgesetzgebung der Sow/etunion 
(Berlin: Berlin Verlag, 1978), pp. 54-65. • 
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Congregations rilay employ clergy, utilize houses of prayer, and cover their costs 
through financial contributions of those participating in worship services. They 
may have worship gatherings and celebrate religious rites, insofar as they do 
not disturb the public order and do not interfere with the rights of fellow citi­
zens. Any social and charitable activities and any special organizations for men. 
women, youth, or children are forbidden, as are any kind of special religious/ 
cultural presentations, conversation groups, libraries, etc. Religious rites may not 
be perfonned outside of the worship space, though the authorities may grant 
exceptions, especially for funerals. 
The spiritual leadership of the religfous communities (of the Moscow Patri­
archate, etc.) may maintain teaching institutions within narrow limits, hold 
workshops for making worship objects (such as candles), publish religious litera­
ture, and maintain relations with religious communities at home and abroad. 
All the aforementioned activities, with the exception of the religious rites 
that take place within the worship building, require state permission-which can 
be granted or denied according to the authorities' personill religious/political dis­
cretion. Likewise, a permission already granted can be withdrawn at any time 
without explanation. Thus, religious communities are completely without rights 
and at the mercy of the Council for Religious Affairs of the U.S.S.R. Council 
of Ministers and its supervision of religious communities. The state not only uses 
its power to control and dominate the organizational structures of the religious 
communities, but it also does not shy from exercising a more or less strong influ­
ence on the spiritual-theological content of religious communities with the aid of 
the largely pliable spµitual leaders. Furthennore, the state manipulates the spiri­
tual leadership to carry out additional restrictions of worship practice in the 
religious communities not foreseen in the law, which creates the outside. impres­
sion of "voluntariness." In this manner a portion of the party policy of religious 
-oppression is veiled. 
F. The Extent of the Right of Private Worship 
As a matter of principle, private performan�e of religious rites is permitted 
in the home-that is, simple home and /amily devotions. They need permission 
only if clergy are required, such as for dispensing sacraments for the seriously ill 
or dying. In closed institutions and establishments, namely, in hospitals, the 
sac.raments may be received only with state permission. Even in these instances 
the authorities. decide according to their personal judgment. The legal prohibi­
tion against pilgrimages to cloisters and other "holy places" constitutes a serious 
attack on the iridividual right of the freedom of worship and of religious usage. 
App¥ently it aims to do away with religious traditions that have deep roots 
among the people. The instruction in question infringes upon the freedom of 
movement with regard to religion, which is protected by international law. The 
religious Soviet citizen is discriminated against compared to atheists, who are 
allowed to travel freely to the ,"glorious sites of the Revolution;" 
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G. The Right to Religious Education 
A key aspect of the private right of worship is the right to religious educa­
tion. In the U.S.S.R. this right lies in a gray area between legality and illegality.7 
The right for parental education is regulated in Art. 18 of the principles of mari­
tal and family legislation as follows: "Parents. should educate their children in the 
spirit of the moral code of the founder of Communism, look after their physical 
development, the education and preparation for a societally useful activity ... 
Parental rights are not to be exercised in conflict with the interests of the chil­
dren." 
The definitions amount to an indirect prohibition of children's religious 
education, for the "moral cod_e" in whose spirit education is to be conducted 
can be found in the program of the Soviet Union's Communist Party. However, 
Communist and religious morality are mutually exclusive according to the im­
mutable view of the party. While officially no formal prohibition of children's 
religious education by parents has been derived from this, it is unmistakably 
pointed out in the pertinent literature that a conscientious exercise of parental 
· rights excludes religious education. In short, while religious education is not 
expressly forbidden, it is not allowed in the "well-understood" (read: "Commu­
nist") interests of the child-a point of view whose contradiction is resolved only 
when it is understood as an expression of an anti-religious, atheistic, repressive 
strategy. Since the desired express prohibition of religious education would lead 
domestically to a civil war with little chance for success and internationally to 
a loss of face for the state because of its blatant contradictions to human-rights 
conventions, only the path of political tactics can lead to the state's unchanging 
goal. While tepid religious education is indeed disapproved of though tolerated 
without sanctions , intensive religious education is opposed through administra­
tive and juridical measures that include even the withdrawal of the right to edu­
cation. 
Absolutely forbidden, according to official judgment, are the use of physical 
or psychic force in religious education, as is delegating other people-especially 
clergy-to conduct it. Therefore, children's religious education can occur only in 
the family and can be conducted only by the parents. 
These restrictions of parental rights obviously infringe on the standards of 
religious freedom in international Jaw that have been recognized. by the Soviet 
Union. If the pertinent human-rights conventions guarantee parents even the 
right of nonstate educational facilities, then the mere delegation of religious 
education to catechists of religious societies is clearly quite allowable. Indeed, 
one must say that in a state structure like that of the U.S.S.R., in which the 
entire educational system is nationalized, the carrying out of religious instruction 




7Luchterhandt, Die religiose Gewissensfreiheit, rp. 36-48. 
90 Religious Liberty 
The reluctance to allow nonstate, religiously instituted educational establish- ! 
ments infrlnges on the human right of religious freedom. The Soviet Union has 
rejected the observance of this duty on the basis that the right of nonstate edu­
cational establishments is valid only for those states .in which such establishments 
already exist. That is to be firmly rejected, for Art. 13 of the Social Rights Cov­
enant and Art. 5 of the UNESCO Convention also guarantee, as stated, the right 
to found private educational facilities with state recognition. The Soviet argu­
ment cannot be accepted-namely, that the nationalization of the educational 
system excludes applying the right to nonstate educational facilities-for then 
one could refuse to guarantee human rights at home on the ground that one's 
own constitution did not foresee them. If this were valid, then one would have 
to ask for what purpose international-law human-rights documents ·are ratified. 
H. The Right of Religious Equality 
The right of religious equality means two things for religious citizens: from 
·a formal perspective, they are to have_ the same rights as other citizens, without 
consideration of their religion; from a material perspective, the general law is to 
respect their religiosity and not subject them to restraint of conscience. It allows 
them a much more deviating behavior in keeping with their religious conscience, 
where the conscience is fundamentally concerned and the guarantee of t�1e reli­
giously alternative behavior is acceptable to the state and therefore tolerated by 
it. 8 
The last prohibitions dealt with-of organizing religious instruction outside 
the family and of founding private educational facilities-are already evidence of 
. discrimination against religious citizens in the are.a of the educational system. 
The very conditions in this area show that the religious citizen is not yet even 
provided with the formal right of equality. On the contrary, it borders on cyni­
cism when Soviet legislation on one side prohibits discrimination against citizens 
on account of their religion but on the other side guarantees to religious as well 
as atheistic parents the right to the atheistic education of their children and to 
· "equal" access to decidedly anti-religious state educational facilities. Such legis­
lation that is apparently sympathetic to human rights endangers precisely the 
human right of religious freedom. 
Further. discrimination may be seen in that access to religious literature in 
public libraries is denied the religious citizen, while atheistic citizens may check 
out atheistic literature without hindrance. Another aspect of anti-religiously- · 
motivated discrimination in the cultural area is the reluctance to grant religious 
societies access to state communications media .. 
In the political area, religious citizens are already discriminated against by 
. constitutional law, because leadership in state and society is reserved exclusively 
, for members of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (see Art. 6 of the 
8Ibld. 
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Soviet Constitution)-and religious citizens may not join the party, since party 
membership and religious membership are unreconcilable (Art. 2 of the party 
statutes). This violates Art. 25 of the Civil Rights Covenant. Political discrimina­
tion carries over into economic and professional areas. It finds expression in clos­
ing off the religious citizen's access to higher positions and even entire branches 
of state service, as well as positions in business and social organizations. From 
the official side, this is openly admitted and justified on the grounds that a reli­
giously oriented functionary could not fulfill the main objective of the Soviet 
state, namely, the bu�ding up of Communism and the educating of fellow citi­
zens "in the spirit of high Communist consciousness." Consequently, "religious 
membership" in matters of public personhood functions as a criterion of a quali­
fication deficiency. The religious citizen's human right of the freedom to choose 
· 
an occupation is therefore exceedingly restricted; there is a long list of forbidden 
occupations. Definitively excluded is any involvement with the educational sys­
tem, culture, or science. This discrimination has already worked against admis­
. sion to higher levels of education, especially universities. 
The artificially contrived restrictions by the Soviet state (numerns clausus) 
in regard to access to theological-training institutions is one aspect of discrim­
ination in the area of freedom to choose an occupation. It is well known that 
especially the academics and seminaries of the Russian Orthodox Church have to 
turn away a large number of student applicants because of the capricious state 
directives. There are also evidences of discrimination in the area of state social 
services. For example, citizens who are employees of religious associations or 
institutions for the maintenance of buildings for worship (boilertenders, custo­
dians, guards, etc.) worry about being excluded by law from the state old-age 
and invalid insurance if they also attend worship services. 
Since pilgrimages are a specifically religious form of tourism, their prohibi­
tion, as already noted, infringes on the current right available to all citizens to 
move freely within the territory of the state. Also, the state refusal to permit 
religious prisoners the minimal exercise of their beliefs is a discrimination vis-a­
vis their atheistic fellow citizens as well as a directly serious restriction of the 
human right of religious freedom. On the contrary, the religious prisoners are 
punished because of their possible religious activity. They are denied the posses­
sion of religious literature (including the Bible). Considering the spatial and 
human isolation of prisoners, one must see an especially serious violation of the 
human right of religious freedom in the sense of Art. 18, para. 1 of the Civil 
Rights Covenant. 
I. International Aspects of Religious Freedom 
Because of the international character of the great world religions that ex­
presses itself partially in an international organization of religious communities 
(the Catholic Church, etc.), as well as in more or less well-developed confessional, 
ecumenical, and interreligious contacts, the international dimension of the human 
right of religious freedom is of great importance. Naturally, this concerns not so 
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· : much relig'..-.Jus freedom as an individual right as it does the activities of religious 
societies. Several examples can be given: participation in international confer-
. ences, congresses, or other .kinds of religious gatherings; the reception and ex­
change of religious literature; the sending or receiving of financial support; study­
ing at a foreign religious institution; pilgrimages to Mecca, Jerusalem, Rome·, Mt. 
Athos, Lourdes, or other places; visits with another or one's own church leaders, 
as in the case of the Lithuanian bishops with the Vatican; national religious 
societies' joining international religious associations or international nongovern­
mental associations; etc. 
The ease of international relations depends on the permeability of the bor­
ders and the state's readiness to permit and foster private foreign contacts. As is 
known, the Soviet Union unfortunately has distinguished itself in this through 
an inordinate amount of repression. For the most part, the U.S.S.R. fulfills the 
negative expectations that one tends to have of a totalitarian system. 
I can express myself briefly as to what concerns the legal side of the proble­
matic. All international actions by Soviet citizens are, in principle, subject to the 
prohibition of the state by the withholding of permission, which in every case is 
granted (or not) by the appropriate party and state authorities. Complete control 
dominates. As always, the state aiso decides here, according to its political dis­
cretion (that is, there is no means of legal redress). Since it concerns a political 
judgment, the primarily repressive tendency of the party's religious policy also 
naturally operates here. 
· 
The practice of granting permission differs greatly and understandably fluc­
tuates over time. Repression operates at its strongest against "simple" religious 
citizens; practically speaking, they have no possibilities of cultivating internation­
al religious contacts. Unequally more favorable is the situation of the leaderShip 
of the religious societies, especially in the case of the Moscow Patriarchate. Here 
the state-has, as formulated· in a resolution of the Central Committee of the 
Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. at the beginning of 1961, its own direct in­
terest "in bringing religious organizations and their leading personages into the 
struggle for peace, the unmaskfu.g of anti-Soviet propaganda that is generated in 
foreign countries, as well as the explanation of Soviet legiSlation concerning wor­
Ship and of the condition of religion in the U.S.S.R."9 
Accordingly, the centraf state authority for supervision of religion (the 
Council for Religious Affairs of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers) is obligated 
to support religious societies "in the development of international ties, ill the par­
ticipation in the struggle for peace and the strengthening of friendShip between 
peoples" (Art. 2 of the Statute of 1966). The officially sanctioned religious com­
munities of the U.S.S.R. can develop their international contacts only at the 
price of placing themselves simultaneouSly in the service of party-state foreign 
politics and by fulfilling concrete assignments of the authorities. In practice, it 
'See Lucnterhandt,.:.We ReBgi.oniguetzgebung, pp. 26-27. 
Otto Luchterhandt 93 
can be detennined that the state has on a number of occasions in. past years 
allowed, especially on behalf of Lutheran communities, the introduction of reli­
gious literature from abroad and has proffered other assistance including, in rare 
cases, study at theological institutions in foreign countries. The Russian Ortho­
dox Church, as is well known, has congregations outside the U.S.S.R. and evi­
dently can care for this part of its organization without special hindrance from 
the state. With respect to international contacts, religious Soviet citizens are no 
better or worse off than their religiously indifferent or atheistic fellow citizens, 
for repression of the Soviet regime affects all Soviet people to the same extent. 
!IL Concluding Remarks 
The comparatively favorable impression one receives from the notable prac­
tical opportunities that religious communities have for becoming involved in in­
ternational matters cannot mask the fact that the typical Soviet citizen's ability 
to exercise the human right of religious freedom is restricted to conducting reli­
gious rites in a building of worship or within one's own four walls. Art. 52 of 
the Soviet Constitution, which regulates freedom of conscience and which the 
Soviets always praise when speaking about international relations, offers only a 
minimum of religious freedom; it is a standard of law that is not much beyond 
avoiding a prohibition. This falls far short of the human right of religious free­
dom's content, which the U.S.S.R. has pledged itself to respect and guarantee, 
in numerous international human-rights conventions. 
This minimum of religious freedom in the U.S.S.R. does not result from the 
alleged natural dying out of religion, which Marx and Engels assumed to be a 
concommitant of the development of Communism. Rather, it appears to be the 
�- result of a constant suppression (at times severely' at other times more mod­
erately, pursued) of citizens' and people's opportunities to develop religiously. 
A quick look at the history of the Russian Orthodox Church bears this out. In 
1939 the Church had only several hundred congregations in the U.S.S.R. By 
1945 there were more than 20,000; this number did not change till the end of 
the 1950's. Suddenly, by 1966 there were only slightly over 7 ,500 congregations. 
The numbers have diminished somewhat since then (approximately 6,900).10 In 
comparison to the dramatic decline under KhruShchev, it has remained relatively 
stable. 
The fluctuation is not hard to explain in light of the state's previously · 
described opportunities for administrative intervention with regard to religious 
freedom. This policy's guiding principle is repression, and one of its chief charac­
teristics is the anti-religious orchestration of religious legislation. Both factors 
rest on the fact that the U.S.S.R. as a closed worldview state denies religion's 
1°0tto Luchterhandt', "Geknebelt und dennocli lebensflihig. Die Russisch-Orthodoxe 
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:right to exist, as a result of which it also denies tne legitimacy of religious com­
munities.11 Therefore, the U.S.S.R. has separated itself from the spiritual foun­
dation of tolerance, which is nothing else than the realization built into the state 
apparatus that for the state there can be no final truth, because the breakdown 
of the medieval system of the comprehensive rule has made the question of truth 
an object of dispute for people. With these suppositions the state can fulfill its 
basic function of being the union of peace for everyone living in a certain region 
only if it wisely declares it!elf "neutral" in the question of truth and resists the 
temptation to identify itself with a definite "partial" (that is, representing only 
one side) "Truth." There is also the irony that the U.S.S.R. recognizes Art. 52 
of the Constitution and guarantees both an unpronounced freedom of conscience 
as a formal right of citizens and also openness on the question of truth, for the 
"parity" of the religious and nonreligious conscience expressly pronounced here 
has no other meaning in essence. 
Seen in itself, this juridical definition of freedom of conscience is rooted 
in the free human-rights tradition-no wonder, since it comes from the pen of 
Lenin; who took it from the anti-clerical program of left-wing European Llberal­
ism. Seen as such, freedom of conscience in the Soviet Constitution as a juridical 
concept represents a liberal remnant that nevertheless cannot develop its human­
rights effect because both party and state base themselves exclusively on a philo­
sophical Marxist meaning of the freedom of conscience, namely, in the sense 
of a· ''liberation of the conscience from religious superstition" (criticism of the 
. Gotha Program of 1 875).12 
· Only wh�n the Communist }>arty of the U.S.S.R. is prepared to admit that 
· it is dealing with philosophical-that is, "party-bound"-truth which the state 
cannot make compulsory for everyone can the door be opened for true tolera­
tion in the Soviet Union. Unavoidably, that would mean that the Communist 
Party would voluntarily surrender its specific basis of legitimacy for exercising 
dominance. Since such a far-reaching revolution in the ideological and political 
bases of the Soviet state is not to be expected in the foreseeable fufore, one can 
. only hope and work toward the Soviet party's and leadership's lessening-out of 
sober wisdom-the artificial pressure on religious citizens and, as is true in other 
scicialist nations, their conducting themselves with more "tolerance" with respect 
to religious practice. 
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